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ABSTRACT. This article aims at showing the need for a
sound ethical and anthropological foundation of eco-
nomics and business, and argues the importance of a
correct understanding of human values and human nature
for the sake of economics and of businesses themselves. It
is suggested that the ethical-anthropological side of eco-
nomics and business can be grasped by taking Aristotle’s
virtue ethics and Amartya Sen’s capability approach (CA)
as major reference points. We hold that an ‘‘Aristotelian
economics of virtues’’, connected with the CA’s notion
of human richness, can promote the shift to the concept
of personhood, and can lead to a more ‘‘humanized’’
business, by fostering human flourishing, the enhance-
ment of human capabilities, and the pursuit of a more
humane development for each and every person.
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Is it possible to provide an ethical and anthropo-
logical foundation for economics and business? And,
more specifically, is ethics internal to economics and
business or is it just a kind of deus ex machina that
enters the scene ex post, to ‘‘correct’’ negative
externalities? Are the anthropological descriptions and
prescriptions about the behavior of economic agents
and business actors consistent with the way in which
people do behave and ought to behave as human
beings? Or is there a conflict between acting as an
economic agent (or as a business actor) and acting as
a human being?
Leaving these questions in the background, this
article argues the need for a sound ethical and
anthropological foundation of economics and busi-
ness, and shows that a correct understanding of
human values and human nature is crucial for both
economics and businesses themselves. The central
conviction is that only an ethical-anthropological
underpinning can help us to rise above the major
shortcomings of economics and business. The ethical
aspect of this underpinning will show the need to
question the mainstream notion of economic ratio-
nality and to reconnect economic rationality with
the ethical dimension of the human being and hu-
man fulfillment. The anthropological dimension will
be based on the need to criticize the standard notion
of homo oeconomicus and to provide a ‘‘richer’’ and
more complex idea of human being, and thus of
economic agents and business actors too. Both
dimensions are strictly interconnected, since the
notion of rationality prescribes how agents ought to
behave, and such prescriptions, in turn, cannot be
separated from an underlying idea of human beings’
basic features.
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To date, there have been several important critical
investigations aimed at overcoming the flaws of
economics and business. With regard to economic
theory, very important inquiries in the field of
experimental and cognitive economics have sought
to highlight the role of cognitive biases at stake in
economic choices (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979,
2000; Kahneman et al., 1982; Simon, 1982, 1997,
2000). Their findings undermine some basic
assumptions of economic theory, such as its notion
of rationality. These considerations also tie in with
renewed attention to the importance of the emo-
tional dimension at stake in economic choices (e.g.,
Slovic et al., 2002). Another criticism of the flaws of
economics is motivated by the attempt to re-embed
economics in the social context (Hirsch, 1976) and
to re-establish the connection between economics
and ethics (Sen, 1977, 1985, 1987a, b, 1999a). As we
shall see below, these approaches also entail a sharp
criticism of the notion of rationality as it is under-
stood in economic theory. Despite their heteroge-
neity, the different approaches and criticisms are all
very important in acknowledging that cognitive,
ethical, and social limits are always present when
agents (and thus, economic agents too) make a
choice.
Similar criticisms have also been turned upon
business, analyzing decision-making within organi-
zations. The problem here consists in seeing how
individual and collective choices are limited or en-
hanced by ethical, cognitive, and social elements that
play a fundamental role in a company’s organization
and activity. In this case as well, the central question
is whether an organization provides an environment
conducive to human growth and fulfillment and
whether good corporate policy can encourage and
nourish individual growth, by fostering the oppor-
tunities for all the employees to develop their talents
and potential. These concerns have been explicitly
recognized by management studies and form the
basis of ‘‘humanistic management’’ (Mele´, 2003),
whose inquiries tackle the issue of the relationship
between business and management, on the one
hand, and the human condition on the other.
As will be argued later in this article, some of the
most interesting attempts to conceive economics and
business in connection with the fostering of human
fulfillment assume Aristotle’s theories as a starting
point (Collins, 1987; Crockett, 2005; Koehn, 1995;
Meikle, 1995, 1996; Van Staveren, 2001, 2007;
Vranceanu, 2005).
The most influential attempt to apply an Aristo-
telian approach in addressing contemporary eco-
nomic matters and to reconnect economics with
ethics is seen in the research carried on by Amartya
Sen and Martha Nussbaum, who developed an
‘‘Aristotelian-informed’’ approach, namely, the
capability approach (hereafter, CA).
In this article, I will try to show that the CA can
offer additional insights into both economics and
business and can lead toward the sound, ethical and
anthropological foundation of economics and busi-
ness that we are searching for.
In order to support this claim, the next section
pursues a critique of the standard notion of eco-
nomic rationality and argues in favor of a connection
between economic rationality and ethical rationality.
Furthermore, this section demonstrates that such a
connection is strictly linked with the elaboration of
an anthropological model that is much more complex
than homo oeconomicus.
The following section suggests that the ethical and
anthropological side of economics can be grasped by
taking Aristotle’s virtue ethics as a major reference
point: an Aristotelian perspective on economics –
namely an ‘‘economics of virtues’’ – is elaborated to
show that economics is, and ought to be, about human
values and that it can foster human flourishing.
The third section starts by considering the influ-
ence of Aristotle on the CA and engages
Amartya Sen’s version of the approach as a theoretical
framework aimed at re-establishing the connection
between ethics and economics and at highlighting
the importance of a plurality of capabilities to do and
to be. This section also dedicates specific attention to
Sen’s redefinition of the anthropological model
underlying economics, by focusing on the notion of
anthropological richness. Here it is argued that this no-
tion can provide a foundation for a different
anthropological model and can promote the shift
from the notion of egoistic individual to the concept
of personhood.
The last section applies the ‘‘Aristotelian-in-
formed’’ CA’s ethical-anthropological reflection to
business to argue for a more ‘‘humanized’’ business
and to show that economics and business theory can
be compatible with ethics, the fostering of human
values and the enhancement of human capabilities.
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Beyond the homo oeconomicus
One of the major obstacles to the interrelatedness
between ethics and economics is linked with eco-
nomic theory’s claim to be as scientific as the natural
sciences. According to this claim, economic theory
studies human choice behavior under resource
constraints; in contrast to ethics, it does not deal
directly with ends, but only with the means to
realize given ends (Robbins, 1932).1
However, as has been rightly noted, the possi-
bility of a purely positive economic inquiry can be
questioned, for every inquiry is led by some values –
even those of scientific inquiry – and some specific
values play a fundamental role in determining which
questions should be asked (Hausman and McPher-
son, 2006).
Moreover, it is also important to note that the
moral obligations of economic agents can be both a
cause and a consequence of important economic
phenomena, because on the one side moral obliga-
tions can influence the agents’ decisions and their
behavior in economic processes, and on the other
hand economic phenomena can have an impact on
agents’ motivational structure, by enhancing or
limiting their ‘‘moral’’ preferences; at the same time,
economic phenomena are influenced by the way
they are described and evaluated by economic agents
and economists (Hausman and McPherson, 2006,
p. 306 f.). Still, human behavior (including eco-
nomic behavior) is influenced by a wide range of
normative and ethical considerations.
However, how is it possible to draw this con-
clusion? In order to answer this question, we need to
focus on the notion of rationality, which is a central
issue of economics. Now, what does rationality
mean in economics?
According to mainstream economic theory,
rationality consists in maximizing one’s utility
function (which is expressed in terms of individual
preferences hierarchically ranked) under a resource
constraint. Thus, rationality means exclusively
‘‘economic rationality,’’ which is the ground of the
influential rational choice theory2 and concerns the
relationship between preferences and choices: a choice
is rational if it is determined by a rational set of
preferences, and the set of preferences is defined
within the contexts of utility theory. This means that
an individual is rational if, and only if, his or her
preferences can be represented by ordinal utility
functions, and his or her choices maximize utility
(Hausman and McPherson, 2006).
It is thus clear that economic theory does not offer
any specific prescription regarding the nature, con-
tent, or value of preferences, whose rationality is
assured by two purely formal conditions: completeness,
according to which it is possible to express a pref-
erence or a rational indifference among all the pos-
sible alternatives; and transitivity, according to which,
if option A is preferred to B and option B is pre-
ferred to C, then option A is preferred to C too; this
means that preferences for A, B, and C are not on
the same level, but are hierarchically ranked. These
formal conditions have also been defined in terms of
‘‘internal consistency of choice’’, which is at the
basis of the so-called ‘‘weak’’ form of rationality
(Sen, 1977).
Such an understanding of rationality, however,
does entail some serious flaws. In particular, the
possibility of ranking all the preferences in a hier-
archic and transitive way presupposes perfect
knowledge of all the possible alternatives to make a
rational choice, that is, a choice that maximizes
utility. The requirement of perfect knowledge, to-
gether with that of self-interest maximization, de-
fines the so-called ‘‘strong’’ form of rationality (Sen,
1977), which leads to very serious shortcomings. In
fact, its fundamental assumptions are particularly
problematic, especially if we analyze choice behavior
in conditions of risk or uncertainty, since our
rationality, far from being unlimited, is a bounded
rationality,3 as Simon (1982, 1997, 2000) has shown
in an excellent way.
Furthermore, research on cognitive biases in
experimental economics and experimental game
theory has shown that human behavior frequently
deviates from rational choice theory.4 This is why
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 2000) and Kahn-
eman et al. (1982) argued for the need to abandon
‘‘folk psychology’’ – on which the standard notion
of economic rationality relies – and to direct atten-
tion to the framing of decisions, which means to
highlight the psychological complexity of human
choices (see also Slovic et al., 2002).
Despite some limits, these inquiries – often with a
contribution from the neurosciences (hence, the
branch of neuroeconomics) – pursue a critique and a
redefinition of the monistic conception of rationality
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underlying mainstream economics, and aim at
overcoming some flaws and biases of rational choice
theory and neoclassical economics.
The biases of the standard notion of economic
rationality are also connected with the formal char-
acter of its prerequisites. In particular, although the
prerequisites of rationality are formal and no
assumption about the content of preferences is made,
economics cannot be ‘‘value-neutral’’, as it claims. In
other words, economics, even though it seeks neu-
trality to ethics, ends up by endorsing a specific
ethical position. In fact, indifference to the content
of preferences implies an ethical subjectivism and ethical
relativism, according to which the identification and
choice of values are relative to each and every
individual, and individual preferences exclusively
depend on the individual’s ethics, whatever those
may be. This is based on the conviction that indi-
vidual well-being is the only element that counts and
that, even if different individuals have different ac-
counts of well-being and different preferences, all
the sets of preferences are on a par for the func-
tioning of economic processes. To put it another
way, even if nothing is stated about the content of
preferences, this principle of ‘‘minimal benevo-
lence’’ (Hausman and McPherson, 2006, p. 65) –
according to which, other conditions being equal, it
is morally good that people enhance their own well-
being and satisfy their own preferences – rests upon a
view of economic agents as utility maximizers and
self-interested individuals (Hausman and McPher-
son, 2006, p. 64). Such a view leads to the Homo
Oeconomicus model to which a great part of con-
temporary economic theory refers. In brief, we can
say that homo oeconomicus is an exclusively self-
interested individual, seeking to maximize self-
interest and perfectly conscious of the consequences
of his or her choices.
From these considerations, it follows that a
redefinition of the neoclassical notion of economic
rationality is fundamental, and also involves a
reconsideration of the anthropological model proper
to (neoclassical) economic theory, according to
which human beings would be oriented to self-
interest achievement and to preference maximiza-
tion (and, then, to the improvement of their well-
being or utility) under resource constraints.5 An
inquiry into the missing ethical capabilities in the
standard notion of economic rationality is thus
needed, and requires a revision of the anthropolog-
ical model underlying economics.
Toward an ‘‘economics of virtue’’
If the standard notion of economic rationality entails
some deficiencies that have an ethical dimension,
and if it lacks an adequate ethics, which ethical
theory then can fill the gap? The suggestion of this
article is to take a major ethical tradition – Aristotle’s
virtue ethics – as a reference point and to focus on a
contemporary approach that has been widely influ-
enced by Aristotle’s thought: the capability approach
(CA).6 In general, the CA can be defined as a theory
of human development and quality of life, or as ‘‘a
broad normative framework for the evaluation and
assessment of individual well-being and social
arrangements’’ (Robeyns, 2005, p. 94), the core
characteristic of which is the focus on peoples’
‘‘capabilities to do and to be’’ (Sen, 1987a, b, 1993,
1999a), namely, what people are effectively capable
to do and to be (whereas people’s effective states of
doing and being are called functionings).
Actually it is important to point out that – as will
be clarified later in this article – the CA is neither a
mere reformulation of Aristotelian theories, nor a
simple neo-Aristotelian approach, but rather, an
approach that seems to be compatible with Aris-
totle’s reflection on ethics (Van Staveren, 2007,
p. 31) and economics; this is why the CA could be
defined as an ‘‘Aristotelian-informed’’ approach that
does, however, entail its own peculiarities and shows
influences from other theories that in some cases let
it deviate from a ‘‘pure’’ Aristotelian underpinning.
More specifically, Aristotle provides us with a
‘‘richer’’ conceptual framework for analyzing the
relationship between economics (and business) and
ethics. Relying on an Aristotelian framework, the
CA deepens the analysis of these connections and is
the theory that most prominently highlights the
importance of a plurality of capabilities to do and to
be, and captures the Aristotelian focus on the plu-
rality of life dimensions to flourish. In general, both
Aristotle and the CA argue the relationship between
ethics and economics by highlighting the crucial role
of the ethical and evaluative dimension in economic
processes. Economics then, cannot do without the
consideration of ethical assumptions and outcomes,
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because such assumptions and outcomes deeply
influence economic behavior. This ethical dimen-
sion can be grasped by putting forward the role of
human values, which go far beyond merely eco-
nomic ones and can re-orient economic activity
beyond the pursuit of mere self-interest, toward the
pursuit of human fulfillment. This is why both
Aristotle and the CA share the attempt to show that
economics is, and ought to be about human values.
Let us start with Aristotle: it is interesting to note
that an Aristotelian perspective is at the basis of
some recent attempts to show the intrinsic connec-
tion between ethics, economics, and human flour-
ishing (Meikle, 1995; Van Staveren, 2001, 2007).
According to these approaches, Aristotle is credited
with giving a central role to four ethical capabilities
(moral commitment, emotion, deliberation, and
human interaction), which are neglected by main-
stream economic theory (van Staveren, 2001).
Highlighting these ethical capabilities also entails a
revision of the anthropological model underlying
economics.
Aristotle’s theory indeed represents a compelling
starting point and a fruitful theoretical horizon for
establishing the close link between ethics and eco-
nomics, and showing that the latter is not an end in
itself, but a means to achieve further ends that are
extra-economic, and concerned more generally
about ‘‘human flourishing’’ (eudaimonia) and the
‘‘good life’’ (Pol, I, 9, 1257b, 40–1258a, 2). Human
flourishing or eudaimonia defines the ‘‘human good’’
– that is, the good which is proper to the human
being – and ‘‘implies the possession and the use of
one’s mature powers over a considerable period of
time’’, ‘‘the fulfillment of the natural capacities of
the human species’’ (Cooper, 1975, p. 89, n. 1).
According to Aristotle, economics (oikonomike)
has a functional, not finalistic, nature and it is a
necessary, but not sufficient, instrument for attaining
a good life. Good life, in fact, even though it cannot
do without the possession of material goods, does
not exhaust itself in such a material component, but
depends rather on a plurality of human dimensions.
Wealth, Aristotle states, is ‘‘a set of instruments’’
(Pol, I, 8, 1256b, 37–38) and bears its value ‘‘only if
it is ‘useful’, that is, in function of something else’’
(NE, I, 5, 1096a, 5–7). Analogously, crematistics
(chrematistike), or the acquisition of goods, is
‘‘according to nature’’ only to the extent to which it
aims at obtaining ‘‘the goods necessary to live and
useful to the community of the State or the family’’
(Pol, I, 8, 1256b, 29–30), but it degenerates into
unnatural crematistics if it overcomes the limit of
necessity and becomes an end unto itself. Thus, the
acquisition of goods (crematistics) and the art of
managing them (economics) are important, but only
insofar as they maintain their functional nature. In
contrast, they become ‘‘against nature’’ if they are
assumed as an end.
An ideal of self-moderation is thus at stake in
Aristotle’s understanding of economic affairs: on the
one hand, (material) wealth is to be evaluated by
how it contributes to a good and flourishing life; on
the other hand, only by working out the constitutive
elements of a good and flourishing life can we
identify what to demand from the economy.
The good life is a virtuous life: according to
Aristotle, virtues are those dispositions ‘‘for which a
person becomes good and well performing its
function’’ (NE, II, 6, 1106a, 22–24): virtues are real
and actual traits of the character and thus contribute
to the formation of a good character. More precisely,
Aristotle states that virtue is ‘‘a disposition con-
cerning choice, consisting in a medietas [a Mean] in
relation to us’’ (NE, II, 6, 1106b, 36–11076a, 1):
such a Mean, found as it is between two extremes, is
evidently of a qualitative nature and, from the point
of view of good, it represents an optimum, or an
excellence. The virtuous action is indeed teleologi-
cally oriented toward excellence, i.e., toward the
formation of a good character and the fulfillment of a
good life (i.e., human flourishing or eudaimonia):
therefore any specific human activity – and thus
economic activity too – ought to be oriented by the
reference to this telos (eudaimonia, indeed). The way
in which virtue should be pursued is indicated by
deliberation, that is, a voluntary act of human will, a
real choice, rather than the determinate outcome of
an algorithm, depending on external constraints (van
Staveren, 2001, p. 8).
In conclusion, according to an Aristotelian per-
spective, economic affairs are not free-standing;
consequently, sound economic theories (and prac-
tices) cannot be defined by merely quantitative
parameters but need to be assessed by qualitative
criteria, the most important being the opportunity,
for each agent, to realize his or her own potential
and thus to fulfill himself or herself in a flourishing
Re-Thinking the Anthropological and Ethical Foundation of Economics and Business 435
life. In other words, endorsing an Aristotelian per-
spective makes it possible to think of economics as
means toward human flourishing and excellence.
These considerations have important counterparts
from a philosophical-anthropological perspective. In
fact, whereas neoclassical economics depicts human
beings as ‘‘disembodied and disembedded individu-
alists who only have subjective preferences’’, the
Aristotelian framework implies that there is ‘‘a
shared though differentiated human nature’’,
namely, ‘‘a shared human tendency to become virtuous
and not a virtuous human nature’’ of an essentialist
kind (van Staveren, 2001, p. 10).
The above concept means that human beings are
also considered capable of acquiring virtues that
perfect them. As a matter of fact, since actions
cannot be separated from the people who perform
them and depend, first, on the agent’s motivational
structure even more than on ‘‘exogenous enforce-
ment’’ mechanisms, and since there exists a mutual
relation between actions (and choices) and character
(and preferences), it is possible to argue that prefer-
ences (and thus character) are subject to a change in
time.
Human richness and capabilities
enhancement
At this juncture, the concept of capability enters the
scene. In fact, according to a capability perspective,
human beings are not a priori entities: they fulfill and
actualize themselves through their agency, namely
through their capabilities to do and to be. But what
is a capability? According to Sen, the term ‘‘capabil-
ity’’ means substantive freedom, i.e., a real opportunity to
be and to do something, which best expresses the
positive side of freedom (Sen, 1999a). This is why
Sen argues that positive freedom (freedom to achieve
something) can be defined in terms of a person’s
capability (Sen, 1999a, p. 25) or, in other words, it
can be seen in the form of ‘‘individual capabilities to
do things a person has reason to value’’ (Sen, 1999a,
p. 56). In other words, capability is the substantive
freedom to achieve alternative functioning combi-
nations (Sen, 1999a, p. 79): functionings, in their
turn, are states of doing and being.
According to Sen, the identification of funda-
mental capabilities is context-dependent: this is why
he rejects any attempt of ‘‘fixing a cemented list of
capabilities that is seen as being absolutely complete
[…] and totally fixed’’, since ‘‘pure theory cannot
‘freeze’ a list of capabilities for all societies for all time
to come’’ (Sen, 2005a, p. 158).7 His idea is that the
identification of fundamental capabilities should rest
on ‘‘public reasoning’’, which is defined as a dem-
ocratic procedure aimed at creating the space for
shared evaluations (Sen, 2005a, p. 163). At the same
time, however, he expresses the need for an ‘‘ethical
objectivity’’, which entails respect for individual
plural evaluations and the importance of developing
‘‘views from a ‘certain distance’’’ (Sen, 2004, p. 161,
2005a, p. 160 f.).
In this regard, it is interesting to note that Sen, in
advocating such an ethical objectivity, specifically
refers to Aristotle and argues the need for an
‘‘Aristotelian ethics’’ based on the ‘‘fulfilment of
valuable functionings and the capability to create and
enjoy these functionings’’ (Sen, 2006, p. 52). Even
from these brief considerations, it is thus clear that
the CA embraces some major Aristotelian ideas: in
particular, the CA recovers the founding elements of
Aristotle’s ethical theory, his idea of the good as
interconnected with human capabilities and functi-
onings, his focus on the multi-dimensional and dy-
namic character of human beings, as well as his idea
that human beings flourish and fulfill human nature
in particular ways that vary from person to person,
even if they all strive toward human flourishing
(eudemonia). The comparison could go so far as to
consider the notion of capability itself as corre-
sponding to Aristotle’s idea of dynamis (Sen, 1993, p.
126). Furthermore, as has been rightly noted, ‘‘the
valuational exercise put forward by the CA has
strong Aristotelian roots’’ (Comim, 2008, p. 164),
and this has also been recognized by Nussbaum and
Sen (1988, p. 315).
It is thus evident that even if Aristotle is not the
only one to exert an influence on the CA, his
influence is crucial and has been explicitly recog-
nized by Nussbaum (1986, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1995,
2000) and later by Sen as well (1987a, 2006; see
also Nussbaum and Sen, 1988, p. 308 ff.).8 In
particular, with regard to economics, Sen recog-
nizes in Aristotle the founder of the ‘‘ethical ori-
gin’’ of economics, which he seeks to restore, in
contrast to the prevailing ‘‘engineering’’ approach
(Sen, 1987a).
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In order to do develop his ethical approach to
economics, Sen pursues his well-known criticism of
mainstream economic rationality and its underlying
‘‘narrow view’’ of the person (the homo oeconomicus
model), according to which human beings are seen
merely as the ‘‘location of their respective utilities’’
(Sen and Williams, 1982). In opposition, he high-
lights the motivational complexity of every human
choice (and thus of economic choice too), and ex-
plores a plurality of capabilities to do and to be
(actions and ways of being) as the basis of human
behavior and human identity. In particular, he
demonstrates that, if people behaved in the way ra-
tional choice theory prescribes, they would act like
‘‘rational fools’’ (Sen, 1977).
The redefinition of (economic) rationality (on
which the actions of economic agents rely) is thus
strictly linked with more sophisticated assumptions
about the notion of the agent usually assumed by
economic theory as a strictly ‘‘economic agent’’.
This is why Sen’s earlier works sought to criticize
the standard notion of the economic agent as homo
oeconomicus. Human beings, he argued, are much
more sophisticated than the way economic theory
depicts them (Sen, 1977) and human actions and
decisions are not only driven by self-interest, but also
by sympathy and commitment. In particular, commit-
ment is strictly connected with a person’s moral
principles and can also diverge from personal well-
being: it can modify a person’s goals and his or her
rational choice, by giving importance to other
people’s aims that cannot be included in the pursuit
of personal interest (Sen, 2005b, p. 7). These
considerations clarify Sen’s redefinition of (eco-
nomic) rationality: by recognizing the importance of
commitment and moral obligations, (economic)
rationality can no longer be conceived as mere self-
interest maximization, and the rational economic
agent can no longer be conceived as a mere selfish
utility maximizer. In particular, rationality includes a
critical scrutiny of values and objectives that underlie
every behavior (Sen, 2002, p. 53 f.): its major
function therefore is of an ethical-normative kind, and
is strictly connected with the capability to think and
act with wisdom. In other words, rationality,
according to Sen, concerns the identification of
fundamental human values and objectives and their
concrete fulfillment through practice. Furthermore,
the importance of commitment and the scrutiny of a
person’s values and objectives are also connected
with the notion of personal identity, which is defined
by the way a person considers himself or herself,
according to his or her values and objectives. Per-
sonal identity however, is strictly linked to social
identity, a person’s capability to identify himself or
herself with other persons, to consider himself or
herself in relation to others.9 This is why in his later
works, Sen no longer focuses exclusively on the
identity of the economic agent, but rather on the
identity of agents, human beings that perform actions
in relation with other human beings (Sen, 1999b,
2007).
Throughout his reflection, Sen tackles both eth-
ical and philosophical-anthropological issues at the
basis of economics: in particular, both his criticism of
neoclassical (utilitarian) economic theory and his
redefinition of rationality have an ethical foundation
and are grounded in the need to overcome a narrow
anthropological view and to show the anthropological
complexity of human beings. However, what does
anthropological complexity mean? In order to an-
swer this question, we need to develop a twofold
line of thought.
First, the CA attributes high importance to human
diversity. This implies respect for difference and
plurality, since each person differs from everyone
else, and there is a plurality of (different) persons.
However, such a respect for difference and plurality
does not degrade into a form of subjectivism, nor
into radical individualism. On the lines of Aristotle,
the CA assumes that there are important spheres of
shared human experience (grounding experiences) that
define fundamental capabilities, which ought to be
preserved and fulfilled in a virtuous life (Nussbaum,
1993). There are also, nevertheless, differences and
plurality among individuals that need to be pre-
served. Thus, we might argue, at the level of
humanity in general, there are universal capabilities,
but personal (and particular) ways of developing
them. As one might notice, the acknowledgment of
the diversity among human beings is also consistent
with the CA’s understanding of human flourishing as
influenced by Aristotle. In fact, as we have seen,
according to Aristotle, human beings flourish and
fulfill human nature in particular ways that vary from
person to person. CA stresses this point, arguing that
flourishing depends on the development of our
capabilities, which are always personal.
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There is also a second level of analysis, which refers
to the concept of a person. At this level another kind
of diversity becomes evident, the diversity within
human beings that we might call intrinsic diversity. In
fact, diversity is also seen in internal characteristics
within every person, as shown by the notion of
capability itself: people have various aspirations, de-
sires, preferences and, above all, various capabilities.
The misleading utilitarian ‘‘narrow view’’ of human
beings consists exactly in overlooking their intrinsic
pluralism and in reducing them to one function, and
moreover to a merely quantitative one, that of utility
maximization. Similar to the attention to diversity
among individuals, the attention to human com-
plexity and intrinsic diversity is also consistent with
the CA’s Aristotelian notion of flourishing, which
depends on different life-dimensions and not on just
one function: this means that human beings are
complex entities that are characterized by an intrinsic
anthropological multidimensionality as well as the
interconnection of different dimensions.
This point has important implications for the way
economics should be understood. In fact, Sen distin-
guishes between the idea of being ‘‘well-off’’ and
that of being ‘‘well’’, or of having ‘‘well-being’’.
The idea of being ‘‘well-off’’ conveys opulence and
refers to a person’s command over exterior things,
whereas the idea of being ‘‘well’’, or of having
‘‘well-being’’, refers to something in a person that
(s)he achieves. The latter expresses a distinctively
personal quality lacking in the former (Sen, 1985).
We can say that in the second case, the person can
flourish, whereas in the first, (s)he can only maxi-
mize his or her utility and enjoy opulence. But
flourishing, as we have seen, means realizing the
highest Good in a virtuous life in the highly
important context of social relations. How, then, can
human beings flourish? Of course, not by focusing
on quantitative-economical wealth (opulence), but
rather on an internal qualitative richness, which goes
beyond the concept of opulence; only such an
intrinsic and qualitative constitutive plurality can
foster self-realization and flourishing. In order to
further develop this point, we can speak of an
‘‘anthropological constitutive plurality’’, in which
different dimensions and capabilities are connected
(Giovanola, 2005).10
Now, the notion that best expresses the
‘‘anthropological constitutive plurality’’ and makes
the basic assumptions of the CA’s idea of person-
hood explicit is the notion of human richness, which
seems a very central issue assumed by, and implicit
in, the major ideas of the CA itself: why human
richness, and what does it mean?
The notion of human richness has been widely
discussed by a thinker who, along with Aristotle,
exerted great influence on the CA: Karl Marx, in
his first writings. The Marxian influence on the CA
has been explicitly acknowledged by both Sen
(1980, 1985, 1987a) and Nussbaum (1988, 2000): in
particular, they refer to Marx’s focus on positive
freedom (Sen, 1987a) and to his Aristotelian
understanding of human functionings (Nussbaum,
2000), which are said to be closely linked to the
notion of capability (Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 1980,
1985, 1999a).
Now, Marx’s interpretation of the notion of
richness is intrinsically connected with his idea of
positive freedom and his understanding of human
functionings, and can be grasped through a capability
perspective. In fact, in his Manuscripts, Marx argues
that instead of considering richness and poverty as
political economy does, one should rather pay
attention to the ‘‘rich human being’’.11 According to
Marx, such a ‘‘rich’’ human being needs both plu-
rality of human dimensions and relationships with other
human beings to fulfill his own potential, that is, to
become really human, and thus social. On one hand,
human beings should be capable of, i.e., free to, fulfill
their own potential and to function in different
ways. On the other hand, both poverty and richness
should gain a ‘‘human, and therefore social mean-
ing’’: in other words, the highest richness for each
human being is other human beings, and such a
richness is felt in the form of a need (Marx, 1844,
Third Manuscript). This means that self-realization
can fully succeed only if the social and relational
dimension of personhood is recognized, since every
person is intrinsically relational. In other words,
through their relational dimension, human beings
can become ‘‘richer,’’ since their relationships with
others increase their identity. This recognition, far
from turning into something like a communitarian
identity, highlights the importance of the interper-
sonal relationality and means that interpersonal rela-
tions can change each one’s personal identity. This
element is particularly crucial in the CA too and is
strictly linked to the role of commitment and to the
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interconnection between personal identity and social
identity.
These considerations introduce another very
important feature expressed by the notion of
anthropological richness and implicit in the CA, the
dynamic dimension of personhood. The CA’s
intrinsic plurality, and its focus on the dimension of
‘‘being able to do and to be’’ shows the importance
of a dynamic (and never ending) process in which
people constitute their identity, and pursue human
flourishing.
This also means that the way we are can be
changed by developing our capabilities. This is also
evident from the CA’s re-interpretation of the
Aristotelian Greek concept of eudaimonia: according
to the CA, in fact, human flourishing consists in a
complex self-realization, but the basic idea is that
there are other possibilities than the one I am real-
izing now: there is neither a fixed nor a firm form of
the self. In this regard, the concept of richness seems
to express in the best way this openness to new
possibilities of the self.
In short, the notion of anthropological richness is able
to express the following dimensions of identity: the
intrinsic plurality of capabilities and life dimensions,
which we could define as the intrapersonal relationality
of the self; the interpersonal relationality, namely, the
socio-relational dimension of the self, according to
which human beings are intrinsically ‘‘relational,’’ so
that each one ‘‘needs’’ to be in relation with the
others; and the dynamic dimension of the self,
according to which identity is a dynamic notion, for
human flourishing is an ongoing and never defini-
tively defined process. This is why the notion of
human richness, as noted above, can serve as the
ultimate foundation for CA’s concept of personhood
(Giovanola, 2005).
Toward a more ‘‘humanized’’ business
If we attempt to apply the ethical-anthropological
conception outlined above to business and man-
agement, the latter would undergo such substantial
changes that they would depart in no small measure
from their prevailing assumptions. In general, the
ethical-anthropological inquiry that has been
developed in the previous sections aims at recon-
necting business theory and practice with the
fostering of human values and the enhancement of
human capabilities. The question now is whether
rational economic activity in business (usually
identified by the pursuit of self-interest and profit) is
compatible with ethical activity, and whether the
pursuit of efficiency is compatible with the fostering
of human fulfillment. The analysis of these ethical is-
sues also requires a deep reflection on the vision of
the human being at the basis of business, although
most prevailing business theories lack an adequate
anthropological investigation.
On the first point, we can state that with regard to
business, recognizing the role of ethics means
affirming that ‘‘if ethics is not also acknowledged as
valid in itself and desirable by all members of a firm,
including its managers and owners, it will not be
convincing and effective’’ (Koslowski, 2008, p. 36).
In other words, it is necessary to show that ethics is
not external, but internal to business behavior, since
it does play a fundamental role in the structure of
preferences and desires of business actors. In this
regard, the Aristotelian framework and the CA can
offer us fruitful elements, by highlighting the role of
human values in economic choices and by pointing
out the mutual relation between actions (and choi-
ces) and character (and preferences).
On the second point, both Aristotle and the CA
help us develop a different anthropological model on
which business can rely. Thanks to their reflection,
we can develop more human models in business and
a ‘‘humanized’’ company strategy (Andrews, 1989),
and carry out more humanistic management, that is
‘‘management that emphasizes the human condition
and is oriented to the development of human virtue,
in all its forms, to its fullest extent’’ (Mele´, 2003,
p. 79).
It is not by chance that some of the most inter-
esting attempts to conceive business in connection
with the fostering of human fulfillment assume
Aristotle’s theories as a starting point (Collins, 1987;
Crockett, 2005; Koehn, 1995; Meikle, 1996;
Vranceanu, 2005): in this context, some scholars
have developed an ‘‘Aristotelian approach to busi-
ness’’ to talk about corporations and organizations in
general (Solomon, 1992, 2004). The basic idea is
that, according to Aristotle, one has to think of
oneself as a member of the larger community – the
Polis for him, the corporation, the society, and so on
for us – and strive to excel, to bring out what is best
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in ourselves and our shared enterprise. What is best
in us – our virtues – are, in turn. defined by that
larger community, and therefore no ultimate
antagonism exists between individual self-interest
and the greater public good (Solomon, 2004). In this
view, the corporation is seen as a community, and is
characterized by the search for excellence, the
importance of integrity and sound judgment. All of
this can lead to a more cooperative and humane
vision of business, where the virtues of honesty,
trust, fairness, and compassion become central in the
competitive business world, and moral courage is
needed (Solomon, 1992). According to this view, a
company should be considered as a community of
persons rather than a mere instrument for profit,
could foster the development of human virtues and
therefore take into account everyone’s need to grow
as a person through human virtues (Mele´, 2003,
p. 85).
However, even if the most important constituents
of every organization are human beings, we rarely
find a definition of business theory that directly re-
fers to individuals, or that is ‘‘human-based’’. The
CA can help us to fill this gap and to think of
business as ‘‘human-based,’’ by focusing on the
constitutive elements of personhood, that a more
‘‘human’’ business should promote. As we have
seen, the CA explicitly recognizes the fundamental
role of a sound anthropological foundation, but it
does not explore in any substantive sense the nature
of the corporate economy, nor does it specifically
address business matters. Nonetheless, in recent
years, the CA has been further developed in an
organizational context by Cornelius and Gagnon
(1999), Cornelius et al. (2008), and Vogt (2005). In
particular, it has been used to analyze the ethical
aspects of participative governance (Collier and
Esteban, 1999) and to understand equality in the
workplace (Cornelius, 2002; Cornelius and Gagnon,
1999, 2000, 2002, 2004).
Still, its application to business could be particu-
larly fruitful to link business with the fostering of
human values and the promotion of authentically
human capabilities. If we apply the main features of
anthropological richness to business and manage-
ment, the latter will be intrinsically aimed at
enhancing people’s capabilities (intrapersonal rela-
tionality of personhood), at promoting genuine
interpersonal relationship in the workplace
(interpersonal relationality of personhood), at letting
employees grow as a person through their practice
(dynamic dimension of personhood), finally, at
contributing to the pursuit of human fulfillment and
a good life.
Conclusion
Assuming Aristotle’s thought and the CA as theo-
retical framework can provide a sound ethical and
anthropological foundation of business. Such a
foundation is particularly necessary and urgent
nowadays, when economic activity and business
have ever greater structural effects on human beings,
the significance of which go far beyond economics.
In fact, such effects can also concern extra-economic
areas, such as the constitution of personal identity
and interpersonal relationships. For example, one of
the greatest social costs of irresponsible companies is
the production of socioeconomic uncertainty and, in
particular, the inability of a growing number of
individuals to project into the future, with the
development, also in their private life, of short-term
engagements, and intermitting family and love
relations (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999, pp. 503–
507), with further impact at the level of personality
(Palmade, 2003).
A reform, then, is needed, especially because
contemporary developments of capitalism have
compromised the reproduction of those values and
‘‘anthropological types’’ that allowed the working of
capitalism itself at its origins, and have substituted
them by more and more quantitative values (Cas-
toriadis, 1996). Now, if we want to avoid reducing
human beings to a corollary of economy, an ethical
and anthropological foundation is needed, because even
the economy, as we have seen, is not independent
from people’s lives and, at a more radical level, af-
fects values, identity, and interpersonal relationships.
This is why we need more human models in eco-
nomics and business. In this regard, the CA, with its
attempt to re-establish the (often perceived as para-
doxical) interconnection between ethics and eco-
nomics and with its inquiry into ‘‘richer’’
anthropological models, can serve as an adequate
theoretical framework.
In other words, the CA helps us to think of eco-
nomics and business as means for human flourishing,
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rather than as ends in themselves. The reason lies in the
CA’s focus on capability enhancement and its elabo-
ration of an ethical-anthropological underpinning
for economics. The core of this underpinning is the
notion of human richness, which makes it possible to
overcome the emphasis on self-interest and personal
well-being as utility maximization, and to promote
the shift from the notion of the egoistic (economic)
individual, to the concept of personhood. This ultimately
refers to CA’s understanding of the concept of human
being as a normative concept, and to its focus on the
notion of a ‘‘common humanity’’ (Nussbaum, 1993).
According to this framework, business practices
would be able to foster human fulfillment and the
enhancement of individuals’ capabilities, and could
contribute to the pursuit of a more humane development
for each and every person.12
Notes
1. Such a position is systematized in a view of eco-
nomics as a positive or descriptive science, which takes
natural sciences as a model and differs from normative
economics (which aims at evaluating economic processes
and outcomes, and formulates prescriptive judgments on
what ought to be done to realize an optimal level of wel-
fare – hence the name welfare economics).
2. Rational choice theory is a framework for under-
standing and often modeling social and economic
behavior. Since a long time, it has been the dominant
paradigm in economics, but in recent decades it has be-
come more widely used in other disciplines such as
sociology, political science, philosophy, and anthropol-
ogy. Rational choice theory usually assumes the view-
point of the individual (methodological individualism)
and rests upon the idea that individuals choose the best
action according to stable preference functions and con-
straints facing them.
3. The term ‘‘bounded rationality’’ indicates that per-
fectly rational decisions are often not feasible, due to
the finite computational resources available for making
them; it is used to designate rational choice that takes
into account the cognitive limitations of both knowl-
edge and cognitive capacity, and is concerned with the
ways in which the actual decision-making process influ-
ences decisions.
4. Also deprivation and adaptation can make human
behaviour deviate from rational choice theory’s assump-
tions. Such issues, however, even if they are very
important, cannot be addressed in this article.
5. Actually, mainstream economics is not only con-
cerned with the issue of individual well-being, but also
with the definition and measurement of social welfare,
which is defined by the principle of Pareto-optimality.
The latter, however, identifies optimality with effi-
ciency (a Pareto-optimal state of affairs defines an effi-
cient allocation of resources) and generates serious
problems, the principal one being the impossibility of
tackling equity reasons and solving the trade-off
between efficiency and equity.
6. The CA approach has been developed by the In-
dian economist A. Sen and the American philosopher
M. Nussbaum. However, the focus here will be on A.
Sen’s version of CA, rather than on Nussbaum’s, for the
former develops greater detail on the ethical-economic
side of CA, whilst the latter deals more specifically with
the philosophical-political side. Even if Sen and Nuss-
baum are the main exponents of the CA, there are vari-
ous (and in many cases important) differences between
them, which, however, do not fall within the purview
of this article. For a detailed analysis of similarities and
differences between Sen and Nussbaum, see Robeyns
(2005) and Giovanola (2005, 2007).
7. The difference between Sen and Nussbaum on
this point is clear. In fact, the American philosopher has
defined a list of fundamental human capabilities (see
Nussbaum, 2000, 2006).
8. On the Aristotelian influence on Nussbaum’s CA,
see Alexander (2008), especially Chap. 3 entitled ‘‘Aris-
totle and Nussbaum’s Hybrid Theory of Capabilities’’
(pp. 125–146). Among the major thinkers and scholars
who have influenced the CA, a fundamental role is
played by John Rawls. Rawlsian influence is especially
evident in Sen’s attempt to extend Rawls’ focus on pri-
mary goods in a ‘‘non-fetishist’’ direction (Sen, 1980)
and in his criticism of Utilitarianism (Sen, 1999a; Sen
and Williams, 1982); Rawlsian influence on Nussbaum
is evident throughout her works and culminates in
Nussbaum (2006), where she discusses both similarities
and differences between her capability-informed philo-
sophical-political approach and the Rawlsian theory of
justice. Rawls’ influence is particularly important since
it is strictly connected with the CA’s version of liberal-
ism and its criticism of utilitarianism, which play a fun-
damental role in both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s theory (on
the tension between CA’s liberalism and the Aristotelian
influence, see Giovanola, 2007). Influence on the CA
has also been exerted by Karl Marx (through both Sen
and Nussbaum), Kant, Grotius, the Stoic tradition (that
especially influenced Nussbaum), A. Smith, K. Arrow
and, more in general, the exponents of social choice
theory (who especially influenced Sen). Of course, a
detailed inquiry into such influences cannot be carried
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out in this article. Nonetheless it is important to point
them out for the sake of clarity.
9. For further inquiry into Sen’s concept of identity,
see Sen (1999b); for an interpretation of Sen’s argu-
ments, see Davis (2003, pp. 150–166), and Giovanola
(2007). For an overview on the role of interpersonal
relationships in economics, see Gui and Sudgen (2005).
10. It is worth mentioning that Sen adopts the expres-
sion ‘‘constitutive plurality’’, although he uses it mainly
as a feature of evaluation. In fact, he distinguishes a
‘‘competitive’’ from a ‘‘constitutive’’ plurality, arguing
that the former regards different views that are alterna-
tive to one another, whereas the latter describes a kind
of ‘‘intrinsic diversity’’ internal to a certain view,
embracing different, though not mutually exclusive, as-
pects (Sen, 1987b).
11. Marx uses the German term ‘‘Reichtum’’ (Marx,
1844, Drittes Manuskript, Sect. 2. Privateigentum und
Kommunismus), which is usually translated as ‘‘wealth’’.
However, since Marx aims at giving it a different
meaning from the prevailing political-economic one,
here I will translate it with ‘‘‘richness’’.
12. Human development is an expression used in CA,
and the United Nations Human Development Reports take
the CA as their theoretical framework.
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